Ementa
Esse curso é o primeiro da sequencia de economia do setor público da pós-graduação em economia da FEA-USP. Nesse bimestre cobriremos temas fundamentais da teoria da taxação: a incidência e o peso morto dos impostos, taxação indireta e direta ótima e seus efeitos na oferta de trabalho.
Tópicos que não serão cobertos nesse bimestre são os efeitos da taxação na poupança, taxação de propriedade, impostos corporativos, seguridade social, bens públicos e externalidades, que ficam como tópicos para uma eventual Economia do Setor Público II.
O curso pretende cobrir o suficiente de teoria econômica e da evidência empírica para que o aluno possa argumentar de forma informada sobre potenciais mudanças tributárias, mas o foco será em métodos empíricos e exemplos de pesquisa de ponta para informar potenciais futuros projetos de pesquisa na área.
Conteúdo e bibliografia
A lista abaixo naturalmente não tem a intenção de ser completa ou exaustiva, mas apenas uma introdução à literatura, com o intuito particular de dar-lhes potenciais ideias de pesquisa na área. Também evitei colocar referências com importância principalmente histórica, ou que já sejam bem cobertas nos livros-texto e na literatura subsequente.
Livros-texto recomendados para economia do setor público (a nível de pós-graduação) são:
Mirrlees, J. and S. Adam (2010). “Dimensions of tax design: the Mirrlees review,” Oxford University Press.
Salanie, B. (2011). “The Economics of Taxation,” MIT press.
Atkinson, A. and J. Stiglitz (2015). “Lectures on Public Economics: Updated Edition,” Princeton University Press.
Esses livros são ótimos, e alunos interessados em economia do setor público eventualmente deveriam lê-los todos inteiramente. Mas os capítulos que fazem parte da leitura do curso são discriminados abaixo. (O Salanié vamos cobrir mais de perto.)
Outra leitura importante são os Handbooks of Public Economics, volumes 1 a 5. (Algumas leituras especialmente importantes são incluidas na bibliografia abaixo.)
1. Introdução
(\(*\)) Atkinson & Stiglitz, caps. 1 e 11.
Giambiagi, F., Alem, A. and S. Pinto (2017). “Finanças Públicas,” Elsevier Brasil, cap. 10.
Musgrave, R. (1985). “A Brief History of Fiscal Doctrine,” Handbook of Pub. Econ., vol. 1, 1-59.
Auerbach, A. and K. Hassett (2002). “A New Measure of Horizontal Equity,” American Economic Review, 1116-1125.
Diamond, P. and E. Saez (2011). “The case for a progressive tax: from basic research to policy recommendations,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25(4), 165-90.
Alvaredo, F., Atkinson, A., T. Piketty and E. Saez (2013). “The Top 1 Percent in International and Historical Perspective,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 27 (3), 3-20.
(\(*\)) Kleven, H. (2014). “How Can Scandinavians Tax So Much?,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 28(4), pp. 77–98.
Piketty, T. (2014). “Capital in the Twenty-First Century,” Harvard University Press. Caps. 13 a 16.
2. Incidência econômica de impostos
(\(*\)) Salanié, cap. 1.
Kotlikoff, L. and L. Summers (1987). “Tax Incidence,” Handbook of Pub. Econ., vol. 2, pp. 1043-1092.
Fullerton, D. and G. Metcalf (2002). “Tax Incidence,” Handbook of Pub. Econ., vol. 4, cap. 23.
Poterba, J. (1984). “Tax Subsidies to Owner-Occupied Housing: An Asset Market Approach,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 99, 729-752.
Gruber, J. (1994). “The Incidence of Mandated Maternity Benefits,” American Economic Review, 84(3), 622-641.
Gruber, J. (1997). “The Incidence of Payroll Taxation: Evidence from Chile,” Journal of Labor Economics 15, S73-S91.
Gruber, J. and B. Koszegi (2004). “Tax Incidence When Individuals Are Time-Inconsistent: The Case Of Cigarette Excise Taxes,” Journal of Public Economics 88, 1959-1987.
Politi, R. B. and E. Mattos (2011). “Ad‐valorem tax incidence and after‐tax price adjustments: evidence from Brazilian basic basket food,” Canadian Journal of Economics 44(4): 1438-1470.
(\(*\)) Harding, M., Leibtag, E. and M. Lovenheim (2012). “The Heterogeneous Geographic and Socioeconomic Incidence of Cigarette Taxes: Evidence from Neilsen Homescan Data,” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 4, pp. 169-198.
Saez, E., M. Matsaganis, and P. Tsakloglou (2012). “Earnings Determination and Taxes: Evidence From a Cohort-Based Payroll Tax Reform in Greece,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 493-533.
Weyl, E. and M. Fabinger (2013). “Pass-through as an economic tool: Principles of incidence under imperfect competition,” Journal of Political Economy, 121(3), 528-583.
Serrato, J. and O. Zidar (2016). “Who Benefits from State Corporate Tax Cuts? A Local Labor Markets Approach with Heterogeneous Firms,” American Economic Review 106, 2582-2624.
Harju, J., Kosonen, T., and O. Skans (2018). “Firm Types, Price-Setting Strategies, and Consumption Tax Incidence?,” Journal of Public Economics 165, 48-72.
(\(*\)) Benzarti, Y. and D. Carloni (2019). “Who Really Benefits from Consumption Tax Cuts? Evidence from a Large VAT Reform in France,” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy.
Sachs, D., Tsyvinski, A. and N. Werquin (2020). “Nonlinear tax incidence and optimal taxation in general equilibrium,” Econometrica, 88(2), 469-493.
Benzarti, Y., Carloni, D., Harju, J. and T. Kosonen (2020). “What Goes Up May Not Come Down: Asymmetric Incidence of Value-Added Taxes,” Journal of Political Economy, 128:12, pp. 4438-4474.
(\(*\)) Ganapati, S., Shapiro, J. and R. Walker. (2020). “Energy cost pass-through in US manufacturing: Estimates and implications for carbon taxes,” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 12(2), 303-42.
3. Custos de eficiência da taxação
(\(*\)) Salanié, cap. 2.
Auerbach, A. (1985). “The Theory of Excess Burden and Optimal Taxation,” Handbook of Pub. Econ., vol. 1, 61-127.
Auerbach, A. and J. Hines (2002). “Taxation and Economic Efficiency,” Handbook of Pub. Econ., vol. 3, Cap. 21.
Hausman, J. (1981). “Exact Consumers Surplus and Deadweight Loss”, American Economic Review 81, 622-676.
Hausman, J. and W. Newey (1995). “Nonparametric Estimation of Exact Consumers Surplus and Deadweight Loss,” Econometrica 63, 1445-1476.
(\(*\)) Goulder, L. and R. Williams (2003). “The Substantial Bias from Ignoring General Equilibrium Effects in Estimating Excess Burden, and a Practical Solution,” Journal of Political Economy 111, 898-927.
Chetty, R. (2008). “Moral hazard versus liquidity and optimal unemployment insurance,” Journal of Political Economy, 116(2), 173-234.
Albouy, D. (2009). “The Unequal Geographic Burden of Federal Taxation,” Journal of Political Economy, vol. 117(4), pages 635-667, 08.
Bento, A., Goulder, L., Jacobsen, M. and R. von Haefen (2009). “Distributional and Efficiency Impacts of Increased US Gasoline Taxes,” American Economic Review, vol. 99(3), pages 667-99.
Chetty, R. (2009). “Sufficient Statistics for Welfare Analysis: A Bridge Between Structural and Reduced-Form Methods,” Annual Review of Economics 1: 451-488.
Gorodnichenko, Y., Martinez-Vazquez, J. and K. Sabirianova Peter (2009). “Myth and reality of flat tax reform: Micro estimates of tax evasion response and welfare effects in Russia,” Journal of Political economy, 117(3), 504-554.
Chetty, R. and E. Saez (2010). “Optimal taxation and social insurance with endogenous private insurance,” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2(2), 85-114.
Einav, L., Finkelstein, A. and M. Cullen (2010). “Estimating welfare in insurance markets using variation in prices,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125(3), 877-921.
Heckman, J. (2010). “Building Bridges between Structural and Program Evaluation Approaches to Evaluating Policy,” Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 48(2), pages 356-98.
Alesina, A., Ichino, A. and L. Karabarbounis (2011). “Gender Based Taxation and the Division of Family Chores,” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 1-40.
Einav, L., Knoepfle, D., Levin, J. and N. Sundaresan (2014). “Sales Taxes and Internet Commerce,” American Economic Review, 1-26.
(\(*\)) Kleven, H. J. (2021). Sufficient statistics revisited. Annual Review of Economics, 13:515-38.
4. Imposto de renda
Salanié, cap. 4.
Mirrlees review, caps. 2 e 3.
Stiglitz, J. (1987). “Pareto Efficient and Optimal Taxation and the New New Welfare Economics,” Handbook of Pub. Econ., vol. 2, 991-1041.
Moffitt, R. (2002). “Welfare Programs and Labor Supply,” Handbook of Pub. Econ., vol. 4, chap. 34.
(\(*\)) Piketty, T. and E. Saez (2013). “Optimal Labor Income Taxation,” Handbook of Pub. Econ., vol. 5.
Akerlof, G. (1978). “The Economics of Tagging as Applied to the Optimal Income Tax”, American Economic Review, 68(1), 8-19.
R. Burgess and N. Stern (1993). “Taxation and Development,” Journal of Economic Literature, 31(2), 762-830.
Saez, E. (2001). “Using Elasticities to Derive Optimal Income Tax Rates,” Review of Economics Studies, 68, 205-229.
Saez, E. (2002). “Optimal Income Transfer Programs: Intensive Versus Extensive Labor Supply Responses,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 117, 1039-1073.
Eissa, N., Kleven, H. and C. Kreiner (2008). “Evaluation of Four Tax Reforms in the United States: Labor Supply and Welfare Effects for Single Mothers,” Journal of Public Economics 92, 795-816.
Beaudry, P., Blackorby, C. and D. Szalay (2009). “Taxes and Employment Subsidies in Optimal Redistribution Programs,” American Economic Review 99, 216-242.
(\(*\)) Chetty, R. (2009). “Is the Taxable Income Elasticity Sufficient to Calculate Deadweight Loss? The Implications of Evasion and Avoidance,” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy: 1(2): 31–52.
Kleven, H., Kreiner, C. and E. Saez (2009). “The Optimal Income Taxation of Couples,” Econometrica, 77, pp. 537–560.
Chetty, R., Friedman, J., Olsen, T. and L. Pistaferri (2011). “Adjustment Costs, Firm Responses, and Micro vs. Macro Labor Supply Elasticities: Evidence from Danish Tax Records,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 126, 749-804.
Keane, M. (2011). “Labor Supply and Taxes: A Survey,” Journal of Economic Literature, 49 , 961-1075.
Chetty, R. (2012). “Bounds on Elasticities with Optimization Frictions: A Synthesis of Micro and Macro Evidence on Labor Supply,” Econometrica 80, 969-1018.
Rothschild, C. and F. Scheuer (2013). “Redistributive taxation in the Roy model,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 128(2), 623-668.
Kleven, H., Landais, C., Saez, E. and E. Schultz (2014). “Migration and Wage Effects of Taxing Top Earners: Evidence from the Foreigners’ Tax Scheme in Denmark,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 129, 333-378.
(\(*\)) Piketty, T., Saez, E., and S. Stantcheva (2014). “Optimal Taxation of Top Labor Incomes: A Tale of Three Elasticities,” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 6(1), 230-71.
Stantcheva, S. (2014). “Optimal income taxation with adverse selection in the labour market,” Review of Economic Studies, 81(3), 1296-1329.
Gelber, A. (2014). “Taxation and Earnings of Husbands and Wives: Evidence from Sweden,” Review of Economics and Statistics 96, 287-305.
Romer, C. and D. Romer (2014). “The Incentive Effects of Marginal Tax Rates: Evidence from the Interwar Era,” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 6, Number 3, 242-281.
(\(*\)) Akcigit, U., Baslandze, S., and S. Stantcheva (2016). “Taxation and the international mobility of inventors,” American Economic Review, 106(10), 2930-81.
Ales, L. and C. Sleet (2016). “Taxing top CEO incomes,” American Economic Review, 106(11), 3331-66.
Rothschild, C. and F. Scheuer (2016). “Optimal taxation with rent-seeking,” The Review of Economic Studies, 83(3), 1225-1262.
Saez, E. and S. Stantcheva (2016). “Generalized social marginal welfare weights for optimal tax theory,” American Economic Review, 106(1), 24-45.
Scheuer, F. and I. Werning (2017). “The taxation of superstars,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 132(1), 211-270.
Mertens, K. and J. Olea (2018). “Marginal Tax Rates and Income: New Time Series Evidence,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 133,1803-1884.
Agrawal, D. and D. Foremny (2019). “Relocation of the rich: Migration in response to top tax rate changes from Spanish reforms,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 101(2), 214-232.
Bell, A., Chetty, R., Jaravel, X., Petkova, N. and J. Van Reenen (2019). “Do tax cuts produce more Einsteins? The impacts of financial incentives versus exposure to innovation on the supply of inventors,” Journal of the European Economic Association.
Kleven, H. (2019). “The EITC and the extensive margin: A reappraisal,” National Bureau of Economic Research No. w26405.
Tortarolo, D., Guillermo, C. and V. Castillo (2019). “It takes two to tango: labor responses to an income tax holiday in Argentina,” UC Berkeley working paper.
Kleven, H., Landais, C., Muñoz, M. and S. Stantcheva (2020). “Taxation and migration: evidence and policy implications,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 34 (2). pp. 119-142.
Rauh, J. and R. Shyu (2020). “Behavioral responses to state income taxation of high earners: evidence from California,” National Bureau of Economic Research No. w26349.
Tazhitdinova, A. (2020). “Increasing Hours Worked: Moonlighting Responses to a Large Tax Reform,” NBER Working Paper No. 27726
Stantcheva, S. (2020). “Dynamic taxation,” Annual Review of Economics, 12, 801-831.
5. Impostos indiretos
(\(*\)) Salanié, caps. 3 e 5.
Mirrlees review, cap. 4
Gordon, R. and S. Nielsen (1997). “Tax evasion in an open economy:: Value-added vs. income taxation,” Journal of Public Economics, 66(2), 173-197.
Gruber, J. and B. Köszegi (2001). “Is addiction “rational”? Theory and evidence,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(4), 1261-1303.
O’Donoghue, T. and M. Rabin (2006). “Optimal Sin Taxes,” Journal of Public Economics 90: 1825-1849.
Carbonnier, C. (2007). “Who pays sales taxes? Evidence from French VAT reforms, 1987–1999,” Journal of Public Economics, 91(5-6), 1219-1229.
Boadway, R. and M. Sato (2009). “Optimal Tax Design and Enforcement with an Informal Sector.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 1(1): 1–27.
De Paula, A. and J. Scheinkman (2010). “Value-added taxes, chain effects, and informality,” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 2(4), 195-221.
Keen, M. and B. Lockwood (2010). “The value added tax: Its causes and consequences,” Journal of Development Economics, 92(2), 138-151.
Besley, T., Meads, N. and P. Surico (2014). “The Incidence of Transactions Taxes: Evidence from a Stamp Duty Holiday,” Journal of Public Economics 119, 61-70.
Pomeranz, D. (2015). “No Taxation without Information: Deterrence and Self-Enforcement in the Value Added Tax,” American Economic Review, 105(8), pp. 2539–69.
Keen, M. and J. Slemrod (2017). “Optimal Tax Administration,” Journal of Public Economics 152, 133-142.
Slemrod, J., Collins, B., Hoopes, J. L., Reck, D., & Sebastiani, M. (2017). “Does credit-card information reporting improve small-business tax compliance?,” Journal of Public Economics, 149, 1-19.
(\(*\)) Alcott, H., Lockwood, B. and D. Taubinsky (2019). “Regressive Sin Taxes with an Application to the Optimal Soda Tax,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 134, 1557-1626.
Gadenne, L., Nandi, T. K., & Rathelot, R. (2019). “Taxation and Supplier Networks: Evidence from India,” Working Paper No. W19/21, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
(\(*\)) Naritomi, J. (2019). “Consumers as Tax Auditors,” American Economic Review 109, 3031-3072.
Slemrod, J. (2019). “Tax compliance and enforcement,” Journal of Economic Literature, 57(4), 904-54.
Bachas, P. J., Gadenne, L. and A. Jensen (2020). “Informality, Consumption Taxes and Redistribution,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper n. 9267.
6. Tópicos em taxação: economia comportamental e bunching
Feldstein, M. (1999). “Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of the Income Tax,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 81(4), 674-680.
Gruber, J. and E. Saez (2002). “The elasticity of taxable income: evidence and implications,” Journal of Public Economics, 84(1), 1-32.
(\(*\)) Chetty, R., Looney, A. and K. Kroft (2009). “Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence,” American Economic Review 99, 1145-1177.
Saez, E. (2010). “Do Tax Filers Bunch at Kink Points?,” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 2, 180-212.
(\(*\)) Chetty, R., Friedman, J. N., Olsen, T., and L. Pistaferri (2011). “Adjustment costs, firm responses, and micro vs. macro labor supply elasticities: Evidence from Danish tax records,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 126(2), 749-804.
Saez, E., Slemrod, J. and S. Giertz (2012). “The Elasticity of Taxable Income with Respect to Marginal Tax Rates: A Critical Review,” Journal of Economic Literature 50, 3-50.
Chetty, R. , Friedman, J. and E. Saez (2013). “Using Differences in Knowledge Across Neighborhoods to Uncover the Impacts of the EITC on Earnings,” American Economic Review 103, 2683-2721.
Chetty, R. and E. Saez (2013). “Teaching the Tax Code: Earnings Responses to an Experiment with EITC Recipients,” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 5, 1-31.
Kleven, H. and M. Waseem (2013). “Using notches to uncover optimization frictions and structural elasticities: Theory and evidence from Pakistan,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 128(2), 669-723.
Bastani, S. and H. Selin (2014). “Bunching and Non-Bunching at Kink Points of the Swedish Tax Schedule,” Journal of Public Economics 109, 36-49.
Best, M., Brockmeyer, A., Kleven, H., Spinnewijn, J. and M. Waseem (2015). “Production versus revenue efficiency with limited tax capacity: theory and evidence from Pakistan,” Journal of Political Economy, 123(6), 1311-1355.
Kleven, H. (2016). “Bunching,” Annual Review of Economics 8, 435-464.
Best, M. and H. Kleven (2018). “Housing market responses to transaction taxes: Evidence from notches and stimulus in the UK,” The Review of Economic Studies, 85(1), 157-193.
Liu, L., Lockwood, B., Almunia, M. and E. Tam (2019). “VAT notches, voluntary registration, and bunching: Theory and UK evidence,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 1-45.
Best, M., Cloyne, J., Ilzetzki, E. and H. Kleven (2020). “Estimating the elasticity of intertemporal substitution using mortgage notches,” The Review of Economic Studies, 87(2), 656-690.
Kroft, K., Laliberté, J., Vizcaíno, R. and M. Notowidigdo (2020). “Salience and Taxation with Imperfect Competition,” National Bureau of Economic Research No. w27409.
Farhi, E. and X. Gabaix (2020). “Optimal taxation with behavioral agents,” American Economic Review, 110(1), 298-336.
Bradley, S. and N. Feldman (2020). “Hidden Baggage: Behavioral Responses to Changes in Airline Ticket Tax Disclosure,” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 12 (4): 58-87.
Mortenson, J. and A. Whitten (2020). “Bunching to Maximize Tax Credits: Evidence from Kinks in the US Tax Schedule,” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 12 (3): 402-32.
Gelber, A. M., Jones, D., & Sacks, D. W. (2020). “Estimating adjustment frictions using nonlinear budget sets: Method and evidence from the earnings test,” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 12(1), 1-31.
Blomquist, S., Newey, W. K., Kumar, A., & Liang, C. Y. (2021). On bunching and identification of the taxable income elasticity. Journal of Political Economy, 129(8).
Avaliação
A avaliação será composta por dois pareceres de working papers dentro da área da matéria (o tema do curso é bem claramente delineado, mas caso tenham dúvidas falem comigo), uma apresentação de um artigo científico e a replicação de um paper (preferencialmente da bibliografia). A apresentação e replicação podem ser do mesmo artigo.
Parecer 1: 14/11 à meia-noite.
Parecer 2: 05/12 à meia-noite.
Data final de entrega da replicação: 21/12 à meia-noite.
As datas das apresentações serão marcadas dependendo do tópico do artigo.
Office Hours
O link para marcar horário de atendimento está disponível na página do curso no Moodle.